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Paternalism, Public Health, and Behavioral
Economics: A Problematic Combination
WENDY MARINER
Many critiques of public health regulations assume that measures
directed at industry should be considered paternalistic whenever they limit
any consumer choices. Given the presumption against paternalistic
measures, this definition of paternalism puts government proposals to
regulate industry to the same stringent proof as clearly paternalistic
proposals to directly regulate individuals for their own benefit. The result
is to discourage regulating industry in ways that protect the public from
harm and instead to encourage regulating individuals for their own good—
quite the opposite of what one should expect from a rejection of
paternalism. Arguments favoring “soft paternalism” or “asymmetric
paternalism” to justify some regulatory measures exacerbate this trend.
This Article argues that most public health regulatory measures directed at
industry are not paternalistic at all, and require little, if any, justification
beyond that required by law. It concludes that definitions of paternalism
grounded in behavioral economics proceed from a flawed premise that
muddies the debate, narrows the range of reasons for regulating industry,
and instead encourages harder paternalistic regulation of personal
behavior.
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Paternalism, Public Health, and Behavioral
Economics: A Problematic Combination
WENDY MARINER*
I. INTRODUCTION
People do not always behave the way we wish them to behave.
Government officials, businesses, non-profit organizations, religious
leaders, colleagues, and friends are often disconcerted by evidence that
people do not always act in their own best interests, variously defined.
Should we care about such behavior? Certainly, we care when the
behavior harms other people, but what about behavior that harms no one
but the actor himself? Or behavior that carries only a risk of harm to
oneself? Or behavior that, while not risking harm, fails to improve the
actor’s economic situation, health, or general welfare?
If we are friends, family, or colleagues, we surely care and may try to
persuade or shame the person into acting differently. If we are parents, we
can influence and sometimes control our children (albeit with mixed
results). But should government act to prohibit, prevent, or discourage
behavior that risks harm only to oneself? I focus on government, because
unlike familial or social connections, government wields coercive powers.
The specific question I address here, in simplified summary, is whether
the recent literature debating paternalism as a justification for government
regulation offers convincing standards for evaluating the legitimacy of
legislation and administrative regulations affecting individual choice.1 I
conclude that definitions of paternalism grounded in behavioral economics,
especially what is often called “soft paternalism,” proceed from a flawed
premise that muddies the debate, narrows the range of reasons for
regulation of industry, and instead encourages harder paternalistic
regulation of individuals.

*

Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law, Boston University School of Public Health; Professor
of Law, Boston University School of Law. My thanks to George Annas, Leonard Glantz, and Wendy
Parmet for sharpening my thinking with helpful discussions of the topic. The failure to respond
effectively is mine alone.
1
Not addressed here are important distinctions among the branches and levels of government
(e.g., judicial, legislative, executive; or federal, state, local, tribal) and the type of action (e.g., statutory,
regulatory, administrative, enforcement). See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism,
74 VA. L. REV. 519, 551–58 (1988) (describing the distinctions in authority between the courts and
legislatures). I would argue, however, that those distinctions do not affect my general conclusions.
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II. DEFINITIONS OF PATERNALISM
Debates over whether and how government should regulate individuals
for their own good or protection are often couched as debates over
paternalism—what it means and when, if ever, it qualifies as a normative
justification for government action.2 Historically, paternalism has been
disfavored in the United States. The presumption seems to be that
government should not adopt paternalistic legislation, except perhaps to
protect from imminent harm people who cannot protect themselves.3
Articles in the literature used to begin with John Stuart Mill’s very simple
principle,4 and perhaps extend to Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative,5
in order to establish the foundational value of individual autonomy and
liberty.6
Recent scholarship, however, often starts with definitions from the
economic literature, especially those challenging the assumption that
consumers always behave rationally to achieve their own economic

2
Scholarly literature abounds with arguments over definitions of paternalism. E.g., JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE 237–38 (1982); SARAH CONLY,
AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 1–7 (2013); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO
SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 19–20 (1986); JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 5–6
(1983); RICCARDO REBONATO, TAKING LIBERTIES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LIBERTARIAN
PATERNALISM 4–5 (2012); Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 THE MONIST 64, 65 (1972); Edward L.
Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 133–34 (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207, 224 (2006);
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon’s Teeth and Claws: The Definition of Hard Paternalism,
20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 659–62 (2004).
3
The presumption is a matter of philosophical argument rather than law. At least with respect to
the states, there is no formal prohibition on states taking paternalistic action, however defined, apart
from constitutional protections of individual rights. See generally E RNST FREUND, T HE POLICE
POWER, PUBLIC POWER AND C ONSTITUTIONAL R IGHTS (1904). State parens patriae power
describes the state’s authority to prevent harm to those deemed to be incompetent, including children.
Federal power is more circumscribed, of course, being limited to the exercise of specific constitutional
powers and those necessary and proper to carry them out, but such powers remain ample. Nat’l Fed’n
of Indep. Bus., Inc. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579–80 (2012).
4
See JOHN STUART M ILL, ON LIBERTY 51–52 (Edward Alexander ed., 1999) (“[T]hat the sole
end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of
action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”).
5
See IMMANUEL KANT , GROUNDWORK FOR THE M ETAPHYSICS OF M ORALS 45–47 (Allen W.
Wood ed. & trans., 2002) (explaining the second formulation of the categorical imperative as requiring
people to be treated as ends in themselves and not as means to an end).
6
Some scholars use such principles to argue, not against paternalism itself, but that the legitimate
scope of government power is limited to protecting individual liberty. See, e.g., R ANDY E. B ARNETT ,
R ESTORING THE LOST C ONSTITUTION: T HE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 322–29 (2004) (discussing
early theories of state police power).
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welfare. Seminal research on how people think by psychologists Daniel
Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and others prompted some economists to admit
that people do not necessarily behave like the rational man of neoclassical
economic theory.8 The efforts of some economists to adjust rationalitybased economic theories to the reality of complex human behavior
produced “behavioral economics.”9 Most behavioral economists use the
psychology literature to argue that human beings are subject to cognitive
biases that cause them to make errors of fact,10 thereby challenging
neoclassical economic theory that true preferences can only be revealed by
actual behavior.
Economists remain divided over theories of rational versus irrational
economic decision makers, as demonstrated by the different views
presented by the three recipients of the 2013 Prize in Economic Sciences
awarded by the Nobel committee in Stockholm.11 Critics of behavioral
economics lean toward the neoclassical school of economics. They offer
both theoretical and empirical critiques, most of which argue for resisting
or severely restricting government intervention, especially in commercial
affairs.12 Perhaps the most persuasive critique is that research in
psychology seeks to identify how people think, not catalog errors in
judgment; but behavioral economics theory focuses almost entirely on the
likelihood of such errors to justify remedial regulation.13
7
Herbert Simon laid the groundwork in this area by questioning human cognitive capacity to
make complex economic decisions, which he called bounded rationality. Herbert A. Simon, Rational
Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. E CON . R EV. 493, 499 (1979).
8
DANIEL KAHNEMAN , THINKING , FAST AND S LOW 412–13 (2011); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, in C HOICES, V ALUES AND
FRAMES 159, 170 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 E CONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
9
See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic
Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics, 124 Q.J. E CON . 51, 51 (2009) (“[B]ehavioral
economics has grown in recent years, stimulated by accumulating evidence that the standard model of
consumer decision-making may provide an inadequate positive description of behavior.”).
10
Among the more salient cognitive biases are framing effects, the availability heuristic, present
bias, optimism bias, and difficulty in understanding probabilities. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra
note 8 (defining terms and summarizing supporting studies).
11
See Robert J. Shiller, The Rationality Debate, Simmering in Stockholm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2014, at BU6 (discussing the different views of human rationality held by the three Prize recipients,
Eugene F. Fama, Lars Peter Hansen, and Robert J. Shiller).
12
See, e.g., Glaeser, supra note 2, at 133 (arguing that “flaws in human cognition should make us
more, not less, wary about trusting government decisionmaking”); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H.
Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106
NW . U. L. R EV. 1033, 1035 (2012) (arguing that behavioral law and economics policies threaten
liberty); Bruce Ian Carlin et al., When Does Libertarian Paternalism Work? 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 15139, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15139 (arguing
that government can make errors of judgment that decrease total welfare as much or more than
individual errors).
13
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW . U. L. R EV.
1165, 1173–74 (2003); Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 1040.
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The debate among economists spread to the legal literature with works
like those by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein.14 Their heirs in law
schools quickly adopted behavioral economic theories to justify some,
though not all, government regulations that could help people avoid
making these cognitive errors.15 It is here that the definition of paternalism
became a critical factor in analyzing normative justifications for
government regulation.
What these scholars have in common is a very broad notion of
paternalism—one that includes interventions targeting industry as well as
those targeting individuals.16 This definition treats almost any effort to
protect people—whether employees, consumers, or individuals outside
commerce—as paternalistic and therefore presumed unjust without special
justification. In particular, it puts government proposals to regulate
industry to the same proof as proposals to directly regulate people. It is
this definition and its implications that I find unconvincing.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE ECONOMIC VERSION OF PATERNALISM
Historically, government action was considered paternalistic if it
required, forbade, or restricted action by an individual for the personal
benefit of that individual and not for the benefit or protection of others.17
For example, Dworkin defined paternalism as “roughly the interference
with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively
to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the person

14
See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6–8 (2008) (advocating libertarian paternalism to explain
how some laws can help people make good decisions without limiting their liberty); Cass R. Sunstein,
Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 29 (2013) (discussing why and how to choose default rules
to discourage particular cognitive errors).
15
See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. R EV. 1211, 1214 (2003) (discussing how
behavioral economics is in its early stage of development and that paternalistic policies may impose
undue burdens); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD . 199,
215 (2006) (describing government campaigns aimed at changing the behavior of individuals engaged
in harmful activities).
16
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law and Economics,
2011 U. ILL. L. R EV. 1675 (describing the use of psychology theories of cognition in behavioral
economics to support concepts of paternalism that include constraints on consumer choice).
17
Dworkin, supra note 2, at 65; see FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing John Stuart Mill’s
principle that invading someone’s liberty for his own good cannot be justified); Shapiro, supra note 1,
at 527–28 (comparing private paternalism with public paternalism’s generally applicable rules). But
see Thaddeus Mason Pope, Is Public Health Paternalism Really Never Justified? A Response to Joel
Feinberg, 30 OKLA. C ITY U. L. R EV . 121, 158 (2005) (arguing that Feinberg’s definition of justifiable
“soft” paternalism includes measures that should be classified as “hard” paternalism).
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being coerced.”
With a moral presumption against paternalism, any
attempt by government to impose such direct regulation on individuals
required ample justification, which was rarely forthcoming.19 In this view,
government regulation is paternalistic if legislature or agency A
intentionally limits Bill’s liberty because A believes that the regulation will
contribute to Bill’s welfare, whether Bill agrees or not.20
Behavioral economists and legal scholars in law and economics
(behavioral or otherwise) describe paternalism as encompassing any action
that ultimately restricts individual choice, without necessarily
distinguishing actions that directly target individuals for their own sake
from actions that target organizations or other entities to protect third
parties, like consumers.21 In this view, legislature or agency A acts
paternalistically when it limits Corporation C’s liberty (for example, by
requiring warnings of product risks) in the belief that the intervention will
contribute to Bill’s welfare, regardless of either Bill or Corporation C’s
consent or preference.
This economic definition of paternalism ignores the target of
regulation and instead views government regulation from the perspective
of the individual, rather than the entity being regulated.22 Using this
“consumer” perspective, it appears deceptively plausible to argue that the
individual suffers a restriction on her freedom of choice. This assumes that
the original array of choices was optimal or desired, or that the restriction
is not desired, neither of which may be true. The restriction then amounts
to a loss of individual liberty that requires justification.23 Thus, if one
accepts the economic perspective on paternalism, the regulation violates
the presumption against paternalistic government regulation.
18
Dworkin, supra note 2, at 65; see Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 3, 3 (Rolf
Sartorius ed., 1983) (defining the principal of legal paternalism and its justification to protect
individuals from self-inflicted harm).
19
Pope offers a comprehensive examination of variations and nuances in definitions of
paternalism. Pope, supra note 2, at 660–63. For a discussion of regulations based primarily on moral
grounds, see infra text accompanying notes 59–61.
20
Pope classes this type of example as hard paternalism. Pope, supra note 2, at 683–84.
21
E.g., Camerer et al., supra note 15, at 1213; Glaeser, supra note 2, at 153–54; Wright &
Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 1062–65.
22
This approach has some support among those who categorize regulating the business to protect
the public as indirect paternalism, in contrast to direct paternalism, which targets the individual. See
CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 18 (discussing how the values used in assessing a certain harm or benefit
belong to the individual); FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 8–9 (discussing the various distinctions of legal
paternalism and their effects); Pope, supra note 2, at 689 (discussing the difference between active and
passive paternalism between the agent and subject).
23
Sunstein and Thaler argue that such restrictions do not really limit liberty. Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. R EV. 1159, 1161–62
(2003). For contrary views, see Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW .
U. L. R EV. 1245, 1263 (2005); Pope, supra note 2, at 672–73; Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 12, at
1067.
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As long as all such regulations are deemed to be paternalistic, they
demand justification. The major contribution of Sunstein and Thaler has
been to offer a justification for some of these regulations. Behavioral
economists and their colleagues in law schools thus refine their definition
of paternalism to defend the kinds of regulation they consider desirable or
inoffensive, such as information disclosure and warnings. These are often
called permissible interventions of “soft paternalism.”24
Sunstein argues that paternalism is really a continuum from soft to
hard.25 That continuum still makes no distinction among the targets of
regulation. Remarkably, his examples of hard paternalism include both
fuel-economy standards and a criminal ban on same-sex relations.26
Glaeser finds that the Surgeon General’s warnings of the dangers of
cigarette smoking in 1965 “can be seen as a successful paternalistic
intervention (especially of the softer kind)” and cites tax rates as an
example of hard paternalism.27
Among Friedman’s examples of
paternalism are fluoridation of the water supply, labeling geneticallymodified organisms in the food supply, and prohibitions on marijuana
use.28
Under these definitions, the line between permissible and
impermissible regulation seems arbitrary. Sunstein would distinguish the
two by the magnitude of the cost imposed on an individual (regardless of
its source), with high costs leaning toward hard paternalism and small costs
toward soft paternalism.29 But this assumes that any cost to anyone is
necessarily paternalistic. Moreover, it is not clear that cost is the correct
measure.
24
See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. E CON . R EV. 175,
175 (2003) (describing the concept of libertarian or soft paternalism that warrants policies to change
personal behavior without limiting liberty); see also Glaeser, supra note 2, at 149 (describing soft
paternalism as “government policies that change behavior without actually changing the choice sets of
consumers”); Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 226 (describing “weak paternalism in which the law does not
prohibit choice, but alters the context in which people make decisions”).
25
Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J.
1826, 1859–60 (2013). Others have described a similar distinction or continuum from impure to pure
paternalism or weak to strong paternalism. E.g., Dworkin, supra note 2, at 68.
26
Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1861. His examples of soft paternalism include fuel economy labels
and automatic enrollment in a particular political party. Id.
27
Glaeser, supra note 2, at 148, 152.
28
David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, 46 C ONN . L.
R EV. 1687, 1753–65 (2014). Friedman’s most striking example is that of a lifeguard who knows that
broken glass is on the beach. Id. at 1697. Friedman describes the lifeguard’s options, from doing
nothing to warning beach goers to requiring them to wear sandals. Id. at 1697–98. In his view, all
these options deprive beach goers of autonomy, but apparently qualify as justifiable paternalism. Id.
What about telling the lifeguard to pick up the glass as part of his job?
29
Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1859–60. Sunstein emphasizes social welfare as the justification,
which he defines in terms of cost-benefit analysis: whether the likely benefits to society exceed the
costs to the entity that is regulated, or whether the social costs of unregulated conduct are large. In this
view, hard paternalism imposes material costs on the end-user, while soft paternalism would impose
only small (non-material) costs on the end-user (or consumer). Id.
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The economic definition of paternalism equates the freedom of a
business to operate with a natural person’s liberty. It supports the idea that
corporations should enjoy the same rights as natural persons.30 If
paternalism is defined as imposing costs on consumers (individuals), then
paternalism can include the regulatory costs imposed on business that may
(or may not) result in costs to consumers. Hence the conclusion that
paternalism includes any regulation of business that requires product
standards, safety standards, or warnings of risks that might increase the
cost of the product to a consumer.
This economic perspective on paternalism creates what Kahneman
might call a “frame.”31 By framing paternalism as including any regulation
that might affect consumer choice, adherents of behavioral economics
narrow the acceptable justifications for a great deal of government
regulation to those that produce a favorable cost-benefit analysis using
economic definitions of cost and welfare. Discourse and disagreement can
only occur at the margins, such as the size of costs and benefits, and
excludes alternative reasons for regulation, as discussed below.
This debate might be dismissed as merely an intellectual turf battle
among academics but for its profound effect on public policy, especially
laws protecting public health and safety. The effect is to circumscribe the
scope of acceptable policy options to those advocated by contending
economic theories, most of which favor limiting industry regulation.
IV. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRY
The economic definition of paternalism opens a wide range of statutes
that impose rules on businesses and other organizations to the claim that
those rules are paternalistic and therefore unjustified. These include
minimum wage laws, building codes, new drug approval requirements,
product safety standards, anti-pollution requirements, anti-discrimination
laws, consumer protection disclosure requirements, professional licensure
laws, and many others. This represents a change in policy discourse, since
few such laws have been opposed on grounds of paternalism, at least since
the Lochner era.32 Moreover, court opinions addressing these postLochner laws dismiss any idea that they might be paternalistic.33
30
See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“Congress . . .
included corporations within RFRA’s definition of ‘persons.’”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (describing free speech rights of corporations as rights of
“associations of citizens”).
31
See KAHNEMAN, supra note 8, at 363–69 (describing framing and research on framing).
32
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down a state law barring employers
from requiring employees to work more than sixty hours per week as interfering with freedom of
contract).
33
See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 393 (1937) (upholding Washington
State’s minimum wage law for women because the “legislature has necessarily a wide field of
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Government, on the other hand, has defended such laws by the need to
prevent industry from harming or exploiting consumers, workers, or the
population at large.34 The government’s purpose is not to regulate a
business for the benefit of the business itself, but to prevent the business
from harming or exposing others to risk, especially where individuals and
industry have unequal information or bargaining power. Consider the
following examples. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits the sale
or distribution of contaminated foods.35 Contrary to some economic
assumptions, this deprives no individual of freedom of choice. Is anyone
eager for the freedom to eat contaminated food? Laws requiring banks to
disclose the cost of variable interest rate loans are intended to give
consumers information they do not have and could not easily obtain
otherwise,36 while banks may have a financial incentive to disguise the true
costs. Are consumers deprived of their preference for obtaining usurious
loans? Or are banks prevented from deceptive practices that increase their
profits and impose unnecessary losses on consumers? Businesses
sometimes argue that minimum wage laws deprive workers of the
“freedom” to work for less money. As the U.S. Supreme Court once noted
with respect to labor laws limiting maximum hours for workers, that
argument would be more credible if it came from the workers instead of
the employer.37
None of these laws should be considered paternalistic. They regulate
the practices of industry for the purpose of preventing harm to others—the
public. They do not deprive the public of any choice that anyone—rational
or otherwise—would make voluntarily. And many may prevent businesses
discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and that peace and good
order may be promoted through regulations designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and
freedom from oppression”); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421–23 (1908) (upholding a state law
barring certain employers from requiring women employees to work more than ten hours per day to
protect the health of the women and their offspring).
34
For example, people in West Virginia are sometimes viewed as having anti-regulatory
preferences, at least until about 300,000 of them could not drink their tap water. Then came questions
about why the government had not acted to prevent the contamination by 4-methylcyclohexane
methanol from Freedom Industries’ property. Leigh Ann Caldwell, West Virginia: New Health
Hazard, Same Story?, CNN (Jan. 19, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/16/politics/west-virginiachemical-water/; Wilson Dizard, Coal Mining’s Long Legacy of Water Pollution in West Virginia,
ALJAZEERA AM. (Jan. 13, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/1/13/coal-pollutionminingwestvirginiamassey.html; West Virginia Company Behind Water Contamination Cited at Second
Facility, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/15/westvirginia-company-water-contamination-cited-second-facility.
35
21 U.S.C. § 331(b) (2012).
36
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012) (describing the need to provide “meaningful disclosure” to
consumers and “avoid the uninformed use of credit”).
37
See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898) (“[The employer’s] defence is not so much that
his right to contract has been infringed upon, but that the act works a peculiar hardship to his
employees, whose right to labor as long as they please is alleged to be thereby violated. The argument
would certainly come with better grace and greater cogency from the latter class.”).

2014]

PATERNALISM, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

1827

from exploiting the very cognitive biases in their customers that
psychologists have identified.38
Today’s proponents of “libertarian paternalism,”39 or “asymmetric
paternalism,”40 appear to take a different view. They seem to believe that
any regulation of business, such as a requirement that automobile
manufacturers install brakes in their cars, must be paternalistic, because it
restricts consumer choices.41 (How many consumers are looking for a car
that cannot stop?) For example, they might view a regulation that limits
the serving size of soda containers to sixteen ounces as paternalistic
because it limits the choices of consumers who want to buy soda.42 This
seems mistaken, for the same reasons that regulating food processors,
banks, and employers does not limit individual choice.
It is true, had the portion cap rule been upheld, consumers would have
had fewer or different options than before. But that, by itself, does not
make the rule paternalistic. The New York City Board of Health would
not regulate consumers; it would regulate certain stores that sell soda in
cups. Like most industry regulation, it would restrict the freedom of
certain businesses to engage in specific business practices.43 The purpose
of the rule was to benefit consumers—by discouraging them from drinking
too much high calorie soda.44 But, from the perspective of the stores, the
rule was intended to benefit third parties—the consumers—and not to
benefit the stores themselves. Regulations like these should not be
considered paternalistic. Nonetheless, the economic view of paternalism
would likely consider the rule as an example of soft paternalism.
38
See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 207–08 (arguing that consumer safety laws protect
consumers from “optimism bias”).
39
See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 24, at 175, 179 (describing libertarian paternalism as both
preserving freedom of choice and authorizing “institutions to steer people in directions that will
promote their welfare”).
40
Camerer et al., supra note 15, at 1212.
41
If the debate over paternalism is conducted in terms of moral principles, then perhaps this view
should not be limited to government regulation. If any change in the choices available to consumers
can be considered paternalistic, then a business that alters its products could be accused of acting
paternalistically and challenged to justify its action.
42
See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681, 698 (2014) (“By restricting portions, the Board necessarily chose
between ends, including public health, the economic consequences associated with restricting profits by
beverage companies and vendors, tax implications for small business owners, and personal autonomy
with respect to the choices of New York City residents concerning what they consume.”). The New
York Court of Appeals did not entertain any argument based on paternalism, but struck down the rule
as beyond the authority of the Board of Health. Id. at 701.
43
See id. at 690 (“The Portion Cap Rule provides in relevant part that ‘[a] food service
establishment may not sell, offer, or provide a sugary drink in a cup or container that is able to contain
more than 16 fluid ounces’ . . . .” (quoting 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(b) (2013))).
44
Id. at 698; see also N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1216, *8–12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013)
(summarizing the Board of Health’s reasoning).

1828

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1817

Soft paternalism appears to include such measures as requiring
industry to disclose (accurate) information and warnings of risks to
consumers, default rules like automatic enrollment in pension and health
plans, and choice architecture in the environment, such as placing fruits
and vegetables first in the cafeteria line.45 They are often justified as “debiasing,” providing factual cues to correct consumers’ errors of judgment
about their own preferences.46 Yet, it is difficult to see such measures as
paternalistic. They do not regulate the consumer at all; they require an
industry to change its practices to give consumers information they may
lack or an efficient way to accomplish a personal goal. They do not restrict
choice; they often expand choice. If, as Sunstein correctly argues, existing
choice architecture is unavoidable and often arbitrary,47 restructuring the
existing presentation of choices without removing any can hardly impose a
new restriction on the consumer’s liberty.
Adherents of behavioral economics argue that these so-called soft
paternalistic policies can be justified as an exception to the presumption
against paternalism because they counteract cognitive biases and
encourage rational or healthy choices without entirely eliminating a
person’s liberty to choose the “irrational” or unhealthy option.48 The
psychology literature is used to support the claim that such measures are
designed to help the individual choose what she would voluntarily prefer in
the absence of bounded rationality. But such an argument is superfluous if
the policies are acknowledged not to be paternalistic.
The foregoing suggests a possible reason why economists and legal
scholars who adopt economic theories conceptualize so many laws and
regulations as paternalistic. Doing so implies that government must
demonstrate as good a reason to regulate business practices as it must
provide to regulate individual behavior. This is inconsistent with the
standards for determining the constitutionality of legislation, since most
constitutional standards for upholding economic regulations are lower than
those for upholding legislation that intrudes on important personal
45
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1835, 1896–97 (stating that the first general principle of
behaviorally informed regulation is: “in the face of behavioral market failures, the best responses
usually are disclosures of information, warnings, default rules, and other kinds of nudges, at least when
there is no harm to others” (emphasis omitted)).
46
See Camerer et al., supra note 15, at 1235 (discussing consumer responses to information
provided on food labels); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 207–08 (discussing the concept of
“debiasing” through consumer safety law).
47
Sunstein, supra note 14, at 5.
48
See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 23, at 1161–62 (arguing that libertarian paternalistic
restrictions do not actually limit liberty). But see Mitchell, supra note 23, at 1035 (disagreeing with
Sunstein and Thaler’s claim that “their proposed policy interventions do not entail a significant
reduction in liberty and individual autonomy”); Pope, supra note 2, at 672–73 (discussing that, while
soft paternalism does not “usurp autonomy,” it does interfere with liberty); Wright & Ginsburg, supra
note 12, at 1034, 1067 (arguing that paternalistic policies restrict individual autonomy).

2014]

PATERNALISM, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

1829

49

liberties.

V. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDIVIDUALS
The concept of paternalism as used in behavioral economics may make
it harder to justify government regulation of industry, but it also makes it
easier to find reasons for government to regulate individuals directly.50
This is because the reasons for making an exception to the presumption
against paternalism are based on cognitive errors and cost-benefit
comparisons.
Cognitive biases are human traits. If people need to be corrected, what
better way than by requiring people to do the “right” thing? Proponents of
soft paternalism seem to assume that soft restrictions do not significantly
limit personal liberty or autonomy, because if people had perfect
information or were free of their cognitive biases, they would really want
what the government is encouraging or requiring.51 In this view, the
regulation contributes to the individual’s “real” subjective preferences as
the individual would define them given perfect rationality and accurate
information.
However, if this is the reason that soft forms of paternalism do not
limit liberty, then why should stronger forms of regulation be seen to limit
liberty? On this reasoning, a requirement that a person act according to his
“real” preferences—those required or forbidden by government—could be
justifiable as a permissible exception to paternalism, whether soft or hard.
Of course, it is typically assumed that the person’s “real” preference is for
49
See 2 R ONALD D. R OTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK , TREATISE ON C ONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 14.6(a)(ii) (5th ed. 2013) (“If the law can arguably be said to rationally
relate to a legitimate goal of government, the Court will uphold the law even though the Justices might
disagree with the wisdom of its provisions. . . . Under the strict scrutiny standard the Court requires that
the law be necessary to promote a compelling or overriding interest of government if it is to limit the
fundamental rights of individual citizens.”).
50
See Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 1166 (“[V]irtually every scholar who has written on the
application of psychological research on judgment and choice to law has concluded that cognitive
psychology supports institutional constraint on individual choice.”); see also George Loewenstein et
al., Asymmetric Paternalism to Improve Health Behaviors, 298 JAMA 2415, 2415–16 (2007)
(discussing asymmetric paternalism policies to improve personal health behaviors); Theresa M.
Marteau et al., Changing Human Behavior to Prevent Disease: The Importance of Targeting Automatic
Processes, 337 SCIENCE 1492, 1493 (2012) (discussing the alteration of environments in order to
constrain human behavior); Robert A. Skipper, Obesity: Towards a System of Libertarian Paternalistic
Public Health Interventions, 5 PUB. HEALTH E THICS 181, 181, 187 (2012) (discussing libertarian
paternalism in the context of the MyPlate initiative); Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public
Health, 69 WASH . & LEE L. R EV. 207, 220 (2012) (discussing the “‘behavioral’ model” in the context
of HIV patients).
51
See Jim Holt, The New, Soft Paternalism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 3, 2006, at 15 (describing
“soft” paternalism as “new,” in comparison to the “old ‘hard’ paternalism”). But see Mario J. Rizzo &
Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905, 910
(describing and critiquing soft paternalism).
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the safe, healthy, or efficient choice.
This is an empirical question,
although perhaps not one for which an adequate experiment could be
designed. How can we know what will contribute to anyone’s welfare? In
the absence of evidence, whose conception of what people really want
should control?53 If cognitive biases alone justify laws to correct
individual behavior, then there appears to be little limit to the conduct and
choices that can be required or forbidden of individuals.
The rationale based on cost points in the same direction. Paternalistic
regulation presumably costs individuals rather little, while the possible
(and often speculative) societal benefits typically appear large.54 If there is
no difference between regulating people and things (such as businesses),
and the justification for regulation is that the expected social benefits of
regulation exceed the costs to the individual, then it is easier to justify
requirements (or prohibitions) for individuals. The cost of compliance is
often minimal for each individual, whereas the aggregate costs to industry
may be substantial. Defining costs and benefits solely in financial or
economic terms tips the scales in favor of regulating people. Psychic costs
attending individual deprivations of liberty are rarely considered, despite
the urging of critics of behavioral economics and law.55
These reasons for “soft paternalistic” measures lay the conceptual
foundation for increased “hard paternalistic” regulation of individuals.
Will hard paternalism necessarily increase in practice? The evidence is
mixed so far. Glaeser cites increasingly strict regulation of alcohol
(leading to prohibition) and cigarette smoking as examples of the power of
soft paternalism to encourage public acceptance of hard prohibitions.56
Friedman, on the other hand, argues that public resistance to paternalistic
measures appears to be growing.57 Here again, one’s definition of
paternalism may account for the different perspectives.
There may be declining public support for government regulation that
52
See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 536 (“[T]he benevolent have a tendency to colonize, whether
geographically or legally.” (alteration in original) (quoting Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and
the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. R EV. 485, 557 (1967)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
53
See Camerer et al., supra note 15, at 1250–51 (arguing in favor of asymmetric paternalism);
Carlin et al., supra note 12, at 16–17 (arguing in favor of libertarian paternalism).
54
A legislature may have limited capacity to conduct an accurate cost-benefit analysis to decide
whether a purportedly paternalistic bill will produce more benefits than costs due to a lack of expertise,
interest group pressure, and legislators’ own cognitive biases. See GORDON TULLOCK ET AL.,
GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC C HOICE 14–15 (2002) (discussing the complicated
motives of government officials).
55
See, e.g., Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 1072 (“The fatal flaw of libertarian paternalism
is to ignore the value of the freedom to err.”).
56
Glaeser, supra note 2, at 153–54.
57
See Friedman, supra note 28, at 1692 (“[Certain] flashpoint zones show a general rejection of
paternalism—especially visible, hard paternalism.”).
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prohibits personal conduct believed to be immoral. At the same time, there
appears to be growing support for certain types of regulation intended to
protect public health.58 The distinction may be difficult to identify in some
instances, but it is important for the purpose of justifying government
regulation of individuals.
Many prohibitions on personal choices were enacted to protect the
morals of the public.59 These have included prohibitions on adultery and
fornication, marriage between persons of different races or the same sex,
and contraceptive use and abortion, as well as prohibitions on
prostitution.60 The national experiment with prohibition against alcohol
might also be included.61 Such laws can be considered paternalistic,
because they were intended for the good of those regulated. They bind
individuals to a particular code of morality for the purpose of ensuring that
people act in what a majority of the legislature determines to be the proper
standard of conduct for the population. But modern U.S. Supreme Court
decisions have largely rejected protection of public morals as a
constitutionally sufficient government purpose.62 This is especially true in
cases involving individual decisions about medical care, which affirm the

58
See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Beyond Paternalism: Rethinking the Limits of Public Health Law,
46 CONN. L. REV. 1771, 1787–88 (2014) (noting that society has grown increasingly willing over time
to accept certain paternalistic measures, such as seat belts and smoking bans); Section 2: Views of
2012),
Government Regulation, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (Feb. 23,
http://www.people-press.org/2012/02/23/section-2-views-of-government-regulation/
(describing
“broad” public support for “strengthening regulations or keeping current regulations as they are now
rather than reducing regulations” regarding food safety).
59
See, e.g., JAMES A. M ORONE , HELLFIRE N ATION : THE P OLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 228–29 (2003) (describing the history of the Comstock Act, which prohibited the distribution
of contraceptives, abortifacients, or lewd or lascivious publications or materials through the mail).
60
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683, 2693 (2013) (striking down Section 3 of
DOMA’s prohibition on same-sex marriage and noting the House of Representatives’ purpose in its
enactment, i.e., to “defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage”); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003) (striking down a Texas statute prohibiting “deviate sexual intercourse with
another individual of the same sex”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a Texas statute
criminalizing an abortion except to save the life of the mother); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440–
42 (1972) (striking down a Massachusetts statute that barred single persons from obtaining
contraceptives to prevent pregnancy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1967) (striking down
Virginia law prohibiting marriage between “a white person and a colored person”); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (striking down Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of
contraception); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003) (striking down a
Massachusetts marriage licensing statute that prohibited same-sex couples from marrying).
61
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI). See generally DANIEL
OKRENT, LAST C ALL: THE R ISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION (2010).
62
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our
own moral code.” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). But see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158–60, 163 (2007) (accepting
“ethical and moral concerns that justify a special prohibition” as one of several state interests in
prohibiting physicians from using a specific abortion procedure).
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individual’s right to accept or refuse care for any reason. Thus, laws
enacted to promote a particular moral or religious code, without an
additional purpose, can no longer be assumed to qualify as justifiable
paternalism.
Legislation that prohibits the sale or distribution of certain products
can feel paternalistic when the product is something that people desire.
The prohibition is directed at the seller or distributor, not the consumer, but
the consumer may be deprived of the product nonetheless. Such laws
might be considered examples of indirect paternalism—the regulation of
sellers for the ultimate purpose of protecting the individual from harm.
Pope helpfully distinguishes (a) indirect regulation, like prohibiting the
sale of marijuana, intended to protect a person from harm or risk to which
that person consents, from (b) the harm principle, which he limits to
regulation that protects a person from unconsented harm, such as product
safety standards.64 The latter fits within the class of non-paternalistic
regulations that prevent industry from harming consumers and the public in
general. The former raises more difficult questions. However, classifying
prohibitions against the sale of contraceptives, for example, as
paternalistic, even weakly or indirectly paternalistic, does not resolve the
question of whether such prohibitions are justifiable.
The practical question is whether the government has the constitutional
power to effectively preclude the public from access to the product or
service. Here, one can use the applicable due process standard, which
considers whether individuals have a cognizable right to the product or
service. The degree and kind of justification for banning or restricting
access (by regulating the seller) depends on the right at stake, with
intrusions on important and fundamental rights requiring greater
justification than interference with less significant rights.65 Since, for the
most part, disputes involve intrusions on aspects of liberty, the standards of
judicial review evaluate the cost that is really at stake in conceptions of
paternalism—the loss of liberty. Due process standards are crude, to be
sure, and often outcome determinative, but as heuristics, at least they
63
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (explaining that previous Court
decisions implied that a “competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment”). See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE R IGHTS OF P ATIENTS : THE
AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO THE R IGHTS OF P ATIENTS (3d ed. 2004).
64
Pope includes indirect paternalism in his definition of paternalism, but not regulation based on
the harm principle. See Pope, supra note 2, at 687–88 (explaining the differences between indirect and
direct paternalism and asserting that “[i]ndirect paternalism . . . might, at first, seem subsumable under
the harm principle” but indirect paternalism deals with consented harm as opposed to unconsented
harm).
65
Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding an Oklahoma statute
prohibiting opticians from fitting or duplicating eyeglass lenses without a prescription under a rational
basis standard), with Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (striking down a statute prohibiting the use of
contraceptives under a strict scrutiny analysis).
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distinguish economic costs from individual rights and autonomy.
A statute that appears to be paternalistic can often be justified on
independent, non-paternalistic grounds.66 For example, prohibitions
against the use of controlled substances have been justified on the nonpaternalistic ground that such use leads to criminal conduct that harms the
public at large.67 Fluoridating a municipal water supply does not regulate
individuals, even if it makes the choice to drink non-fluoridated water
slightly more costly to people.68 Criminal prohibitions on prostitution have
been justified as necessary to protect sex workers from coercive human
trafficking.69 Even if these rationales appear pretextual (and perhaps
motivated by moral concerns), they focus the legislature’s attention on the
harm to the public and are (in theory) subject to removal if the evidence
indicates that they fail to achieve their purpose.
Even where laws most obviously require people to protect themselves,
courts struggle to find an other-oriented, public purpose to avoid upholding
paternalism. For example, courts have used somewhat tortured reasoning
to conclude that motorcycle helmet laws protect people other than the
rider, even though this is neither the primary motive nor effect of such

66
See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 532 (“The point is that paternalist motives are more likely to lead
to enactment of legislation when they are coupled with other motives that are seen to have independent
weight, or when the situation falls on the weak side of the weak-strong continuum.”).
67
See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a) (2012) (prohibiting the
manufacture, distribution, dispensing or possession of controlled substances except as permitted
therein); see also United States v. Simpson, 481 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1973) (“It is beyond
constitutional doubt that Congress has the inherent power to adopt penal and rehabilitative provisions
in response to the present pervasive drug traffic problem. This is particularly true when the quantity of
the drug and its dangerous ingredients affect not only the individual user but society as well.”); D AVID
F. M USTO , THE AMERICAN DISEASE 219 (1987) (describing the belief in the early 1900s that Mexican
laborers were provoked into violence by smoking marijuana).
68
The public health reason for fluoridation—prevention of dental caries, especially among
children whose teeth are being formed and are without access to dental care—may not be necessary to
protect life or limb, but it is undertaken by government entities for the benefit of third parties and has
been uniformly upheld as constitutional by state courts. See, e.g., Ill. Pure Water Comm., Inc. v. Dir. of
Pub. Health, 470 N.E.2d 988, 992 (Ill. 1984) (“We note that many courts, in the interest of public
health, have upheld fluoridation as a proper exercise of the State’s police power.”); City of Port
Angeles v. Our Water–Our Choice!, 239 P.3d 589, 593 (Wash. 2010) (noting that “[t]he legislature
ha[d] explicitly vested the power to decide whether or not to fluoridate in the board of commissioners
of a water district”). The debate today is often an empirical one regarding the level of fluoride that
prevents dental caries without the risk of dental fluorosis. E.g., Proposed HHS Recommendation for
Fluoride Concentration in Drinking Water for Prevention of Dental Caries, 76 Fed. Reg. 2383, 2383–86
(Jan. 7, 2011).
69
See Belkys Garcia, Reimagining the Right to Commercial Sex: The Impact of Lawrence v.
Texas on Prostitution Statutes, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 161, 163 n.14 (2005) (“Some feminists have
argued that maintaining criminalization of prostitution may be the best way to protect women in
prostitution.”).
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laws. Justification of laws restricting smoking depends heavily on the
adverse effects of environmental tobacco smoke on others.71 This suggests
a general reluctance, at least in the judiciary, to regulate personal behavior
solely for the protection of the individual.
The Massachusetts requirement that individuals be covered by public
or private health insurance can be viewed as hard paternalism, because it
mostly protects the individual from financial ruin in case of illness.72 But,
it was also viewed as spreading the risk of financial loss. The Affordable
Care Act’s individual mandate was upheld as a tax, and Congress’s
constitutional authority to impose a tax is not constrained by any personal
right not to be taxed at all.73 Yet, scholars debate whether sin taxes (for
example, on tobacco, alcohol, soda, or gasoline) are paternalistic and/or
effective.74 While there might be moral reasons against imposing a sin tax,
there is no constitutional impediment to doing so.
Civil commitment statutes may be the clearest example of laws that
allow the government to prevent a person from harming himself, but there
are limits to this example. The primary purpose of civil commitment is
protecting others by detaining a person who is likely to harm others (or
their property) as a result of a mental illness that makes it difficult for the
person to control his conduct.75 This is a non-paternalistic standard.
However, most states also authorize civil commitment of persons who are
mentally ill and dangerous to themselves,76 such as persons who attempt
70
See, e.g., People v. Poucher, 247 N.W.2d 798, 799–800 (Mich. 1976) (noting that “[i]f the
helmet succeeds in mitigating what would otherwise be a fatal injury, then not only has the cyclist
survived, but the automobile driver has not killed anyone”).
71
See Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother Is Watching You: New
Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. R EV. 685, 720–22 (2009) (discussing the justifications
for smoking bans as progressing from efforts to prevent individuals from smoking to focusing on the
harm to others to trying to reduce smoking overall).
72
2006 Mass. Acts 58. The Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate does not actually force
anyone to buy insurance; those covered may decline to do so and the penalty is relatively small.
26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(1) (2012).
73
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012). But see id. (“Even if the
taxing power enables Congress to impose a tax on not obtaining health insurance, any tax must still
comply with other requirements in the Constitution.”).
74
See, e.g., Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a
Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AM. E CON . R EV. 186, 190 (2003) (analyzing alternative approaches to sin
taxes as more or less efficient and more or less paternalistic).
75
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (upholding civil commitment statutes when
they require proof of dangerousness and “some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental
abnormality’”); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“The State may also confine a mentally
ill person if it shows ‘by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and
dangerous.’”); see also City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) (applying
analogous standards to civilly commit a homeless person with transmissible tuberculosis who was
unable to avoid spreading the disease to others unless confined).
76
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1)(a)(2)(b) (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2
(2013).
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suicide, which is a paternalistic standard.
Yet, it fits with the state’s
parens patriae power to protect from imminent harm those who cannot
keep themselves safe from imminent harm.78 This power has not been
extended to restricting the liberty of anyone who fails to avoid the risk of
possible future harm to herself.
Scholars advocating the economic concept of soft paternalism,
however, often focus not on a person who harms himself, but on a person
who acts (or fails to act) in a manner that presents a risk of future harm to
himself. In some instances, the concern goes even further: that a person
fails to take affirmative steps to improve his own health. If protection of
one’s own health, in general, became a standard for government regulation
of personal behavior, then it might only be a small step to restrict even
such cherished rights as the right to informed consent to medical care in
order to ensure that the patient’s health is protected—or that the patient
continues to live—regardless of the actual preferences of the patient.79
The arguments favoring paternalism measures for individuals are
moving beyond preventing individuals from actually harming themselves
to preventing individuals from taking any risk of future harm to
themselves. Some of this may be attributed to public health research,
particularly epidemiological studies, that helpfully identify risks to health
across a population.80 From the perspective of the public health
community, the presumption is that people would want to avoid risks of
serious disease or death. Such generalizations can be sufficient reason to
prohibit industry from distributing products or conducting business in such
a manner as to expose the public to the risk of harm. When individuals
themselves are required to avoid risks, however, the standards should and
do differ.
Public health’s relatively recent emphasis on preventing chronic
diseases undoubtedly encouraged attention to individual behavior as a risk

77
It is possible that a person who attempts suicide is not mentally ill and is acting rationally and
deliberately, but in the absence of knowing what an unconscious person actually wishes, the
presumption of mental illness provides the person with an opportunity to live and make her wishes
known.
78
See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“[T]he mere presence of mental illness
does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover,
while the State may arguably confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a
necessary condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on
their own or with the help of family or friends.”).
79
See Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public Health: Beyond Emergency Preparedness, 38 J.
HEALTH L. 247, 257 (2005) (“Public health programs that focus on aggregate outcomes for a
population cannot account for individual values in the same manner as medicine.”).
80
See generally WENDY E. P ARMET , POPULATIONS, P UBLIC HEALTH , AND THE LAW 34
(2009) (arguing for a “population-based legal analysis” of public health and other social policies).
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factor for heart disease, cancers, diabetes, and other diseases.
Unlike
contagious diseases, chronic diseases may arise from a combination of
factors—genetic, environmental, social, political, occupational, financial,
and behavioral.82 Epidemiological studies find associations between a risk
factor and a disease, but do not necessarily purport to determine whether
the factor actually causes the disease.83 Thus, it is difficult to determine
what risks a particular individual may face or the effect of an intervention
on any individual, even if the intervention decreases risk across the
population. Yet, most recommendations for regulation focus on changing
individual behavior, rather than addressing external risks or obstacles, such
as those arising from industry or the social, occupational, or economic
environment.84
The relationship between obesity and chronic diseases is a good
example.85 Changing the behavior of people who are overweight is
difficult, and it may or may not significantly affect the trajectory of chronic
disease.86 Yet, most public health policies focus on changing individual
behavior rather than the environment, education, agricultural policy, food
industry practices, or income; all of which have an effect on health.87
81
See Thomas R. Frieden, Asleep at the Switch: Local Public Health and Chronic Disease, 94
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2059, 2059 (2004) (arguing that more public health resources should be
dedicated to preventing chronic diseases).
82
See INST . OF M ED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC ’ S HEALTH IN THE 21 ST C ENTURY 20–21
(2003) (explaining “there is strong evidence that behavior and environment are responsible for more
than 70 percent of avoidable mortality” and that “[s]ocial and environmental factors create unnecessary
health risks for individuals and entire communities”); OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., THE SURGEON
GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 1 (2001) (“For
each individual, body weight is determined by a combination of genetic, metabolic, behavioral,
environmental, cultural, and socioeconomic influences.”).
83
See ANN ASCHENGRAU & GEORGE R. SEAGE , E SSENTIALS OF E PIDEMIOLOGY IN PUBLIC
HEALTH 6 (3d ed. 2014) (defining epidemiology as “[t]he study of the distribution and
determinants of disease frequency in human populations and the application of this study to
control health problems”).
84
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., supra note 82, at xi, 1 (focusing on the
“opportunity for individuals to make healthy lifestyle choices for themselves and their families” and
how healthy diets and regular exercise “should be promoted as the cornerstone of any prevention or
treatment effort”). But see WORLD HEALTH ORG., DIET, NUTRITION AND THE PREVENTION OF
CHRONIC DISEASES: REPORT OF A JOINT WHO/FAO EXPERT CONSULTATION 2–3 (2003)
(acknowledging “the essential role of diet, nutrition and physical activity” in preventing chronic
diseases but also accounting for “ecological, societal and behavioural” factors when considering the
role of nutrition and diets worldwide).
85
See ABIGAIL C. S AGUY , WHAT ’ S WRONG WITH FAT ? 28, 30 tbl. 2.1 (2013) (describing six
ways to frame the issue of obesity or fat and how each frame suggests a different policy response).
86
Friedman is careful to note the limitations of remedial policies, but appears to base his
reservations about employing them on their likely effectiveness, suggesting that their paternalistic
character is not a moral or legal obstacle to their adoption. Friedman, supra note 28, at 1694–95.
87
See Kelly D. Brownell et al., Personal Responsibility and Obesity: A Constructive Approach to
a Controversial Issue, 29 HEALTH AFF. 379, 380–82 (2010) (critiquing the focus on personal
behavior, and arguing for comprehensive measures to improve the environment affecting food and
physical activity).
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Many of these policies are justified on behavioral economic grounds, on
the theory that overweight and obese people make bad choices that should
be corrected by government intervention.88
VI. A CAVEAT
The foregoing necessarily paints with a broad brush and little nuance.
None of this should be interpreted as challenging the psychological studies
identifying cognitive biases in human thought patterns, which I find
convincing. On the contrary, one might productively apply their lessons to
our perceptions of the costs and benefits (broadly defined) of different
types of health regulation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Public debate over public health regulation may be suffering from its
own bounded rationality. Much of the literature analyzing what justifies
government regulation frames the question in terms of a conception of
paternalism based on behavioral economic theories, which begin with the
premise that paternalism necessarily includes measures directed at industry
that are intended to prevent harm to the public.
This framing
circumscribes the permissible reasons for regulating industry, but expands
the rationales for regulating individual behavior. If any regulation that
might alter or affect consumer choice is characterized as paternalistic, then
a wide range of regulations imposed on industry become questionable.
The psychology literature, then, is used to justify or redeem some weaker
forms of industry regulation, denominated soft paternalism. The argument
is that regulation is necessary in order to compensate for (or take advantage
of) defects in human reasoning. But this justification is more easily
applied to regulation targeting the individual. That is, if the problem is
framed as defects in human cognition, then the range of solutions include
(and is often restricted to) correcting human behavior, to the exclusion of
preventing industry from putting the public at risk. Justifications based on
cost-benefit analysis yield the same result. It is easier to point to errors of
human judgment, negligible costs to individuals, and large increases in
social welfare, than to demonstrate that regulating industry is not costly to
industry. The effect is to discourage regulating industry in ways that
protect others from harm and to encourage regulating people for their own

88
Friedman, supra note 28, at 1719–20. But see Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too
Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & M ARY L.
R EV. 1907, 1912 (2002) (discussing evidence that “experimental subjects—much less real-world legal
decision makers—systematically violate norms of rationality when forming judgments and making
decisions”).
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benefit—quite the opposite of what one should expect from an examination
of paternalism.

